October 23, 2025

Litigation Finance Isn’t a Hidden Tax. It’s a Market Correction.

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W. Tyler Perry

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October 23, 2025

It feels like every couple of weeks an article appears lamenting the rise of litigation finance as the death of capitalism and the birth of something monstrous.  The most recent chorus began over the summer when the CEO of Chubb called litigation finance “a hidden tax on society” in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal.  A month later, the CEO of The Hartford grieved on an investor call that litigation finance has “turned our judicial system into a gambling system.”  And just last month, the American Property Casualty Insurance Association’s Senior Vice President of Federal Government Relations exclaimed:  “Too many baseless claims, filed by lawyers motivated by profit are clogging our legal system with unnecessary lawsuits, increasing costs and delaying swift resolution of genuine legal claims.” 



As someone who has been a big firm defense lawyer, a small firm plaintiff lawyer, and now a litigation funder, I can confidently say that these arguments fundamentally misunderstand litigation finance and its incentives, while simultaneously conflating the interests of large repeat defendants with those of society writ large.

A market correction, not a market distortion. 

Litigation funding corrects a market failure that has long skewed access to justice in favor of those with the deepest pockets.  Complex litigation can cost millions to pursue, meaning that all but the richest corporations and individuals are effectively priced out of the market for justice.  The classic fact pattern is this: a plaintiff has strong claims with clear legal merit, but they just don’t have the financial resources to protect their rights and defend their interests, while the defendant can spend money until the plaintiff runs out or cries uncle.  Litigation finance solves that problem by channeling private capital toward meritorious cases that otherwise could not be brought or litigated to resolution.  Far from distorting the system, litigation funding introduces efficiency and accountability where a profound imbalance in favor of entrenched corporate interests has reigned for decades.



Critics who compare litigation finance to gambling conveniently elide its structural incentives and similarities to other commonly accepted practices.  As an initial matter, we don’t call venture capital or private equity firms gamblers; to the contrary, society generally recognizes that their business is a profoundly difficult profession that requires intellectual rigor, discipline, and discerning judgment.  Litigation funders are no different.  They only get paid if their cases succeed and, as a result, they are risk underwriters who invest only after extensive due diligence, legal analysis, and damages modeling.  By way of limited personal example, my firm funds less than 5% of the litigations that request funding.  That is generally par for the course across the industry. 

A Check on Corporate Risk-Shifting.

It should not be surprising that many of the most vociferous critics of litigation finance are the beneficiaries of the current system’s imbalance—i.e., large, well-capitalized repeat defendants.  These organizations generally thrive on controlling legal exposure and minimizing payouts—even when claims are clearly meritorious.  Litigation finance disrupts that dynamic by giving claimants the financial endurance to see a legitimate case through trial or to a fair settlement.


Accordingly, when Chubb’s CEO calls litigation finance a “hidden tax,” what he really means is that the cost of risk is finally being priced correctly as judgments more closely approximate the harm done.  That is not a tax on society; it is the market doing exactly what it should—allocating costs to those responsible for creating them.



Moreover, litigation finance creates incentives for better corporate governance and compliance.  When companies know that strong claims will not quietly disappear for purely economic reasons, they have a stronger incentive to adhere to laws, contracts, and ethical standards.  That deterrent effect benefits society as a whole, not just plaintiffs and their backers.

Aligning incentives to enhance justice.

Another common critique is that litigation finance “monetizes” justice, turning the courtroom into a marketplace or, as The Hartford’s CEO called it, “a gambling system.”  But this framing misses the forest for the trees.  Justice has always been a capital-intensive effort.  The question is not whether money influences litigation, but whether that influence is merit-based and available to both sides.


Funders’ incentives are fully aligned with those of plaintiffs and their lawyers: they all succeed only if the claim succeeds.  This alignment weeds out weak claims and enforces strategic discipline, while also ensuring that only cases with real merit receive backing.  Funders, like all good investors, are highly rational and have no interest in clogging the courts with meritless claims; to the contrary, they are interested in winning, which means funding only strong, legally sound claims.  If anything, the availability of third-party capital makes the justice system more meritocratic by allowing the strength of a case, not the size of a parties’ wallet, to determine its outcome.

At bottom, litigation finance is not a parasite on capitalism; it is a product of it.  It uses capital markets to promote accountability, deterrence, and the rule of law—the very foundations of a functioning economy.  Viewed through this lens, the discomfort it provokes among entrenched interests is not a bug, but a feature that reveals the pain points in a significant market correction.  Put simply, litigation finance is not a “hidden tax” on society, but rather a long-overdue dividend for the little guy.

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By W. Tyler Perry March 12, 2026
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Before bellwethers, both sides operate with imperfect knowledge about litigation value. Bellwether outcomes provide hard data on how claims perform in actual adjudication, allowing both sides to update their assessments and negotiate from common informational foundations. Bellwethers also serve a quality-control function. Claims that cannot survive trial are revealed as such, and plaintiffs with similar claims must adjust expectations or withdraw. The process operates as a filter separating viable claims from those that cannot withstand adjudication. Addressing the Overreach Critique Critics contend that aggregation inflates claim values, coerces settlements regardless of merit, and manufactures litigation where none should exist. While ultimately outweighed by the benefits, these concerns deserve thoughtful engagement. The critique rests on an implicit comparison to bilateral litigation as baseline. But as the preceding analysis shows, bilateral litigation systematically under-enforces valid claims when harms are diffuse. If critics call aggregation “inflation,” we should recognize bilateral under-enforcement for what it is: deflation. If we accept that the bilateral baseline is itself distorted—producing under-enforcement rather than accurate enforcement—then aggregation’s effects look different. Enabling claims that would otherwise be impractical is not inflation; it is correction. The concern about settlement pressure similarly assumes defendants are coerced into paying for weak claims. But settlement in mass litigation is heavily mediated by information and procedural safeguards. Daubert motions screen expert reliability, summary judgment tests legal sufficiency, and bellwether losses expose plaintiff theories that cannot withstand adjudication. Defendants facing weak claims have ample opportunity to expose that weakness before settlement pressure materializes. Finally, the critique conflates access with abuse. That aggregation enables more claims does not mean it enables more frivolous claims . Centralized proceedings concentrate scrutiny on claim quality in ways bilateral litigation disperses. A transferee judge managing thousands of cases has strong incentives to identify deficient claims. MDL structure provides quality-control mechanisms bilateral litigation lacks. Conclusion Mass tort aggregation restructures litigation economics to make diffuse-harm claims practical. It does this by correcting asymmetries that would otherwise favor institutional defendants (with deep pockets and, at times, questionable judgment ). And by solving collective action problems that would otherwise produce under-enforcement. The alternative to aggregation is not a pristine bilateral system. The alternative is under-enforcement of rights and a free pass for corporate negligence . In that world, valid claims go unfiled, wrongdoing goes unaddressed, deterrence erodes, and the civil justice system serves institutional defendants more effectively than the common citizen consumer. Ignoring this dynamic—and its political ramifications—is dangerous. As Judge Learned Hand warned : “If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice.”